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Abstract 
Evolutionary psychologists have proposed two processes that could give rise to the pervasive 
amounts of human cooperation observed among non-genetically related individuals: 
reciprocity and conformity. We test whether reciprocity outperforms conformity in promoting 
cooperation, especially in a situation when these psychological processes would promote a 
different (non)cooperative response. To do so, across three studies we observe cooperation 
with a partner after learning (a) that their partner has behaved cooperatively (or not) on 
several previous trials (Reciprocity-to-Cooperate) and (b) that their group members have 
behaved cooperatively (or not) on several previous trials with that same partner (Conformity-
to-Cooperate). Although we find that people both reciprocate and conform, reciprocity has a 
stronger influence on cooperation. Moreover, we find that conformity can be partly explained 
by a concern about one’s reputation – a finding that supports a reciprocity approach.  
 
Keywords: Reciprocity; Conformity; Cooperation; Culture; Evolution 
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Reciprocity Outperforms Conformity to Promote Cooperation 
Humans cooperate on a grand scale relative to other species. To explain this exceptional 
ability to cooperate, evolutionary psychologists have suggested that evolutionary processes 
may have shaped multiple psychological mechanisms that promote identifying opportunities 
to cooperate and to avoid being taken advantage of by defectors. One theoretical approach to 
explain the evolution of cooperation is that humans selectively cooperate to acquire direct and 
indirect benefits (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005; Delton, Cosmides, Guemo, Robertson, & Tooby, 
2012; Krasnow et al., 2016). Another theory suggests that imitation and conformity enable 
people to learn group norms of cooperation (Henrich & Boyd, 2016; Richerson et al., 2015). 
Each theory has acquired evidence in support of these psychological processes that determine 
when people choose to cooperate. Yet, no research has been conducted to examine whether 
reciprocity or conformity carries more or less influence on cooperation, especially in a 
situation when one process promotes cooperation and the other defection. 
We examine whether the psychological mechanisms underlying direct and indirect 
reciprocity influence cooperation more than those underlying imitation and conformity to 
cooperative group norms. To do so, we observe how people behave in a cooperative decision 
making task after learning (a) that their partner has behaved cooperatively (or not) in several 
previous interactions and (b) that their group members have behaved cooperatively (or not) on 
previous interactions with that same partner. A conformity approach would predict that 
people’s behavior will track group norms of cooperation. A reciprocity approach would 
predict that people will condition cooperation on their partner’s (expected) behavior. Across 
three studies, we test competing predictions about how people decide to cooperate (or not) 
when reciprocity is opposed to conformity. Do people reciprocate partner cooperation, even 
when they perceive their group has a noncooperative norm? That is, does reciprocity 
outperform conformity to promote cooperation?  
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Reciprocity and Cooperation 
Humans evolved in small-scale hunter-gatherer societies that included dense networks 
for social exchange (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005). In this environment, humans evolved a 
capacity to condition costly cooperation towards partners in situations that could result in 
direct or indirect benefits. Indeed, evolutionary models suggest that the mechanisms of direct 
reciprocity and indirect reciprocity can enable selection for adaptations for conditional 
cooperation (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005).  
 The evolved psychological mechanisms underlying reciprocity function to identify 
opportunities to establish and maintain beneficial relationships (Delton et al., 2012). Such 
mechanisms should identify cooperators and defectors and condition cooperation towards 
others who are expected to cooperate in the present or future interactions. Research suggests 
that people have a specialized ability to identify individuals who have not cooperated in past 
interactions (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005; Delton et al., 2012). Moreover, people have a strong 
tendency to cooperate with others they expect to cooperate (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013). This 
offsets the cost of cooperation by acquiring direct benefits from others’ cooperation.   
Indirect reciprocity, on the other hand, occurs via a reputation as a cooperator 
(Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004). Indeed, cooperation can be a successful strategy when that 
behavior is observed by others and broadcasted to a larger audience, leading to an enhanced 
cooperative reputation, and this subsequently increases a future partner’s tendency to 
cooperate (Wu, Balliet & Van Lange, 2016). Across the studies, indirect reciprocity will be 
investigated by testing whether concern about group member evaluations of own behavior 
(i.e., reputational concern) increases conformity to group member behavior. Additionally, we 
test whether reciprocity outperforms conformity across anonymous and public decision 
making settings. Anonymity should suppress the role of indirect reciprocity in promoting 
cooperation. 
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Conformity and Cooperation 
In those same ancestral, hunter-gather groups described above, people often competed 
with other groups over scarce resources (Bowles, 2009). According to the gene-culture 
coevolutionary theory, intergroup competition could have created selection pressure for an 
ability to acquire group norms, especially norms that promoted cooperation, which led groups 
to be successful during intergroup competition (Richerson et al., 2015). From this approach, 
cooperation among non-genetically related individuals can be explained by an ability to 
follow group norms (Henrich et al., 2015). Indeed, agent-based models suggest intergroup 
competition can lead to the selection of cooperation with ingroup members (Henrich & Boyd, 
1998).  
According to this theory, cooperation arises from group norms, which are acquired via 
imitation and conformity. A conformity psychology involves imitating the most common 
behavior exhibited in a group (Henrich & Boyd, 2001). A body of research suggests that 
people possess exceptional skills for imitating others and a strong tendency to conform to 
group norms (Alpizar et al., 2008). For example, people tend to agree with an ingroup 
member’s answer to a question, even when they know the answer is inaccurate (Asch, 1956). 
Richerson and Boyd (2001) suggest that humans evolved a capacity to form (subjective) 
commitments to groups that motivate conformity to group norms.  
A gene-culture coevolutionary approach also proposes that people follow prestigious 
members of a group, i.e. prestige-biased learning (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Indeed, 
people are more likely to imitate highly prestigious individuals in their group (Cartwright, 
Gillet, & Van Vugt; 2013). Imitation, conformity, and prestige-biased learning should 
promote group cohesion that would essentially lead to the success of groups in intergroup 
competition (Boyd & Richerson, 2009; Henrich, 2004).  
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The Present Research 
The two theories summarized above—Reciprocity and Conformity—are not mutually 
exclusive, but the psychological mechanisms posited under each theory may compete for 
influence over when people choose to cooperate. Here we examine how people decide to 
cooperate in situations when the two theories predict a different cooperative response. Do 
people generally follow group norms of cooperation, even when reciprocity would promote 
noncooperation? Do people reciprocate cooperation, even in the presence of a noncooperative 
group norm?  
To address these questions, we revisit the Asch Conformity Paradigm (Asch, 1956) by 
observing how people behave in a cooperative decision making task with another person after 
they learn how that person behaved on previous trials with other group members. Similar to 
the Asch paradigm, group members have a consistent behavioral response (i.e., cooperate or 
defect). However, our methods differ from the Asch paradigm by involving a social 
interaction that can affect the participant’s outcomes. Moreover, participants observe 
consistent partner behavior on several previous trials (i.e., cooperate or defect). In Study 3, we 
add a prestigious member to the group to increase conformity. In Study 3, we also manipulate 
anonymity of the participants’ decisions to reduce the impact of (indirect) reciprocity.  
If conformity outperforms reciprocity, individuals will imitate group members’ 
behavior, regardless of their partner’s cooperation on previous trials. However, if reciprocity 
outperforms conformity, then people will base their decisions on their partner’s previous 
behavior, regardless of their group members’ behavior. We also test if cooperation is better 
explained by psychological mechanisms of imitation and conformity (e.g., subjective 
commitment and group norms) or the (in)direct benefits of reciprocity (e.g., expectations of 
partner cooperation and reputational concern). 
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Study 1 
Method 
Participants and procedure. Across all the studies, an a-priori power analysis 
(G*Power; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) revealed a required sample size of 704 to 
achieve statistical power of .80 to detect an effect size of d = 0.30. Participants (N = 704; 329 
women, Mage = 36.54 years, SD = 11.32) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) and completed the online study for $1.20. Moreover, participants earned lottery 
tickets based on their decision. Twenty participants won a $2 prize. Importantly, MTurk 
provides reliable and valid data comparable to lab experiments (Casler, Bickel, & Hacket, 
2013), with the advantage of providing relatively heterogeneous samples, e.g., socio-
economic and ethnic diversity (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). Moreover, previous research has 
used MTurk to successfully study the social processes we observed in our research (Bostyn & 
Roetz, 2016; Laporte, Van Nimwegen, & Uyttandele, 2010; Nook et al., 2016). We required 
participants to be located in the United States and have a successful HIT rate of at least 85%. 
The study was a 2 (Group Behavior: cooperative vs. noncooperative) × 2 (Partner Behavior: 
cooperative vs. noncooperative) between-subjects design.  
 Participants provided informed consent and were told that they were online with five 
other participants. Then, they were told that the experiment was divided in two parts. The first 
part required participants to interact with five other participants in a task (labeled the survival 
task), which was intended to form a cohesive group. In the second part, participants interacted 
with another person in a prisoner’s dilemma (PD). Participants were told that they would 
interact in the PD with a new participant called Person B who did not participate in the 
survival task. However, before making their decisions, they received information about how 
each group member behaved with Person B in the PD, and how Person B behaved with the 
other group members.  
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Survival task. In the first part of the study, participants played an activity called 
‘Survival Task’. We used the survival task to increase participants’ cohesiveness in a group 
(Zaccaro & McCoy, 1988). This type of task has been widely employed to promote group 
cohesion (for meta-analyses, see Beal et al., 2003; Evans & Dion, 1991). In this task, 
participants imagined that their spaceship, directed to the moon, has crashed and that they 
must travel 200 miles to reach the rendezvous point. However, they cannot bring all their 
equipment and must make some tough decisions to survive. For this reason, they had to 
prioritize a list of 15 items according to their survival value. The goal was to match their 
ranking with the one provided by survival experts (Carpenter & Radhakrishnan, 2002). They 
were told that their score would be combined with the other five participants who were 
ostensibly online. Next, they were asked to imagine a conversation with the crew about the 
best strategy in this situation (Meleady, Hopthrow & Crisp, 2013).  
We first conducted a pilot study to test whether this task also promoted cohesion in 
online groups. In this study, cohesiveness was measured with six items on a seven-point 
Likert scale (α = .95; Chin et al., 1999). We recruited 150 participants via MTurk and 
randomly assigned participants to one of three conditions: interaction with six members of the 
crew, interaction with two members of the crew, and no interaction with the other members. 
In the latter condition, participants were told that there were five other participants online, but 
that they were independent and making decisions that only affected their own survival. Then, 
in this condition, participants imagined a discussion about the task with a stranger. There was 
significantly more group cohesion when participants interacted with all group members (M = 
5.43, SD = 1.24), compared to no interaction with group members (M = 3.79, SD = 1.59; t(97) 
= 5.75, p < .001, d = 1.16). There was no significant difference between the interaction with 
six members and two members (p = 0.21). 
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Prisoner’s dilemma. Participants interacted in a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) task (Van 
Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). In the PD task, participants and their partner were endowed 100 
tickets and had to decide how many tickets to give to their partner (0-100). Each ticket 
represented a 0.01% chance to win a 2-dollar bonus. Each lottery ticket given to their partner 
would be doubled. This is a PD because the best outcome (300 tickets) results from keeping 
the entire endowment and benefiting from the partner giving their entire 100 tickets. 
However, each person earns more tickets if each person decides to give their entire 100 tickets 
to their partner (200 tickets), compared to when each person decides to keep their 100 tickets 
for themselves (100 tickets). The worst outcome (0 tickets) occurs when a person gives their 
entire 100 tickets to their partner, but their partner does not give them any tickets.  
Group member behavior and partner behavior. Before making their decisions in 
the PD, participants were told that they (and all the other group members as well) had the 
possibility to observe how their future partner (Person B) behaved with each member of the 
group and vice versa. Before making their decisions, participants could observe a screen with 
two columns: one containing decisions from each group member, and the other column 
containing each decision of Person B while interacting with each group member. Participants 
were always the last person in their group to make a decision. The information about group 
member behavior and Person B’s behavior was presented to participants with an average of 9 
seconds between decisions.  
Group member behavior and partner behavior were manipulated to be either 
cooperative or noncooperative. In the cooperative group and cooperative partner condition, 
each group member gave their entire endowment to Person B (99, 91, 91, 96, and 100) while 
Person B gave similarly large amounts to group members (97, 93, 92, 100, and 95). In the 
noncooperative group and noncooperative partner condition, each group member consistently 
gave almost nothing to Person B (5, 3, 6, 4, and 2), while Person B gave similarly low 
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amounts to group members (4, 3, 7, 1, and 5). In the cooperative group and noncooperative 
partner condition, the five group members gave nearly all of their endowment to Person B 
(99, 91, 91, 96, and 100), while Person B gave each group member almost nothing (5, 3, 6, 4, 
and 2). In the noncooperative group and cooperative partner condition, these payoffs were 
simply reversed. Therefore, we created a situation where group members gave almost nothing 
in the PD to Person B, while Person B continued to be cooperative and give their entire 
endowment to group members. We refer to this as the Reciprocate-to-Cooperate Condition, 
since cooperation in this condition would be influenced by reciprocating partner (expected) 
behavior. Conversely, we had a situation when all group members decided to cooperate, but 
Person B was consistently noncooperative. We refer to this as the Conform-to-Cooperate 
Condition, since cooperation in this condition would be influenced by conformity to group 
member behavior. These are the two conditions that enable a test of competing predictions, 
while the other two conditions involve both the group members and Person B always 
cooperating or not cooperating with each other.  
Results  
  We conducted a 2 × 2 ANOVA with group member behavior and partner behavior 
predicting cooperation. This analysis revealed a main effect of group member behavior, 
F(1,700) = 22.88; p < .001, d = 0.36. Participants cooperated more when group members 
were cooperative (M = 41.28, SD = 42.52), than when group members were noncooperative 
(M = 29.61, SD = 34.97). Also, participants cooperated more with a cooperative partner (M = 
51.98, SD = 41.44) than a noncooperative partner (M = 18.99, SD = 28.92), F(1, 700) = 
174.99, p < .001, d = 0.98. There was a significant interaction between group member 
behavior and partner behavior predicting cooperation, F(1, 700) = 86.01, p < .001, η2p = .11. 
Of course, people were more cooperative when both their group and their partner were 
cooperative during previous interactions (M = 69.82, SD = 36.45), compared to when both 
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their group and their partner were noncooperative (M = 24.64, SD = 30.22), t(347) = 12.62, p 
< .001, d = 1.35. We can test if reciprocity or conformity were relatively more influential by 
examining how people cooperate in the conditions where group member behavior deviates 
from partner behavior. People were more cooperative in the condition with a noncooperative 
group and cooperative partner (M = 34.55, SD = 38.57), compared to the condition with a 
cooperative group and a noncooperative partner (M = 13.37, SD = 26.48), t(352) = 6.02, p < 
.001, d = 0.64. Therefore, we observe greater cooperation in the Reciprocate-to-Cooperate 
condition, than the Conform-to-Cooperate condition (see Figure 1). This is initial evidence 
that reciprocity outperforms conformity when these two processes conflict to influence how 
people decide to cooperate.   
 
Figure 1. Means and 95% CI of the effect of group and partner behavior on cooperation, * p < .05. 
Study 2  
Method 
We created a few modifications to the study design to further test the conformity and 
reciprocity accounts of cooperation. First, we manipulate knowledge about the partner’s prior 
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the lack of information about partner behavior should result in an even stronger influence of 
group member behavior on decisions to cooperate. Second, we measure and test two 
competing psychological processes that are hypothesized to affect when people cooperate; 
expectations of partner cooperation and perceived group norms. Finally, we test the 
moderating role of reputational concern and subjective commitment to the group. According 
to an indirect reciprocity approach, people may cooperate according to group expectations 
because they are observed and their behavior can lead to indirect benefits (Wu et al., 2015). 
According to a conformity approach, people only follow group norms of cooperation when 
they have high levels of subjective commitment to the group (Richerson & Boyd, 2001). Yet, 
when people have low subjective commitment to the group (or do not care about their 
reputation in the group), then people will be less likely to conform to group norms of 
cooperation, and will be relatively more inclined to reciprocate partner cooperation. 
Participants and procedure. Participants (N = 701; 342 women, Mage = 35.07 years, 
SD = 11.33) were recruited from MTurk and completed the study for $1.20. Twenty 
participants were assigned a $2 prize. Sample size and characteristics are reported after 
excluding 3 participants who had participated in the previous study. Participants were 
excluded after matching their MTurk ID with the IDs from the previous study. The study 
consisted of a 2 × 2 between-subjects design. The participants were randomly assigned to 
either a Reciprocate-to-Cooperate condition (i.e., group member noncooperation, but partner 
cooperation) or a Conform-to-Cooperate condition (i.e., group member cooperation, but 
partner noncooperation). Participants were also randomly assigned to a condition when they 
had information about their partner’s previous behavior (as in Study 1) or they did not have 
information about their partner’s previous behavior (but continued to have information about 
their group member’s behavior).   
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The procedure is similar to Study 1. As in Study 1, participants (1) were told that they 
were interacting with a group of people currently online, (2) completed the survival task to 
increase group cohesion, and (3) interacted with an additional person who did not participate 
in the survival task in a PD (Person B). However, participants were randomly assigned to 
either (a) observe how each group member and Person B behaved in the PD or (b) observe 
group member behavior, but not Person B’s behavior in the PD. After participants decided 
how much to give Person B, we administered a measure of expected partner cooperation, 
perceived group norm, reputational concern, and subjective commitment to the group. 
 Expectations of partner cooperation. Participants estimated how many lottery 
tickets they expected Person B to give them (0-100). 
 Perceived group norm of cooperation. We asked participants how many lottery 
tickets they thought their group members expected they should give to Person B. We asked a 
general question about the perceived group norm (e.g., “How many lottery tickets do your 
group members think you should give to Person B?”), and also a single question for each of 
the other members of the group (α = .99, e.g., “How many lottery tickets does Participant_1 
think you should give to Person B?”).  
 Reputational concern. Participants completed a measure of reputational concern (see 
Wu, Balliet, & Van Lange, 2015). In this measure, participants rate their agreement with four 
items (e.g., “During the decision making task, I thought about how the other group members 
would think about me”) on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree; α = 
.88). Higher scores indicate higher reputational concern.  
 Subjective commitment. Subjective commitment to a group involves the sense of 
belonging and concern for a group (Richerson & Boyd, 2001). Therefore, we had participants 
complete a perceived cohesion scale as a proxy of subjective commitment to the group (Chin 
et al., 1999; e.g., “I am happy to be part of this group”, “I see myself as part of this group”). 
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Participants responded to six items using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree; α = .95). Higher scores indicate higher subjective commitment.  
Results  
Manipulation checks. When participants observed Person B’s behavior during the 
previous interactions, they expected more cooperation from Person B when Person B was 
cooperative (M = 74.87, SD = 31.92), compared to noncooperative in prior interactions (M = 
12.98, SD = 22.34), t(343) = 20.83, d = 2.24. In fact, even when participants did not observe 
Person‘s B behavior they expected more cooperation from Person B in the cooperative group 
condition (M = 53.47, SD = 33.30), compared to the noncooperative group condition, (M = 
21.64, SD = 26.76), t(346) = 9.81, d = 1.05.  
The manipulation of group member cooperation affected whether participants 
perceived the group as having a cooperative or noncooperative norm. Participants thought that 
greater cooperation was expected by group members in the cooperative group members 
condition (M = 77.04, SD = 32.66), compared to noncooperative group members condition (M 
= 10.86, SD = 16.38), t(699) = 33.89, d = 2.56. Because both manipulations were associated 
with strong effect sizes, we conclude that participants accurately perceive when their group 
and partner are cooperative or noncooperative.  
Cooperation. We conducted a 2 (Reciprocate-to-Cooperate vs. Conform-to-
Cooperate) × 2 (Partner Knowledge vs. Partner Behavior Unknown) ANOVA predicting 
cooperation. Most relevant to our hypotheses, we found a significant interaction predicting 
cooperation, F(1, 697) = 59.90, p < .001, η2p = .079. Replicating findings from Study 1, when 
participants could observe Person B’s prior behavior, then participants were more cooperative 
in the reciprocate-to-cooperate condition (M = 31.41, SD = 36.00), compared to the conform-
to-cooperate condition (M = 23.57, SD = 33.25), t(346) = 2.11, p = .03, d = 0.23 (see Figure 
2).  However, when participant’s did not observe Person B’s prior behavior, they were more 
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cooperative in the presence of a cooperative group (M = 54.98, SD = 39.63), than a 
noncooperative group (M = 22.34, SD = 28.54), t(351) = −8.87, p < .001, d = −0.94. 
.  
Figure 2. Means and 95% CI on how the conformity/reciprocity conditions and information about 
partner behavior influence cooperation; * p < .05.  
Reputational concern and subjective commitment. A multiple regression model 
was constructed in which cooperation was regressed onto the reciprocity/conformity 
conditions (0 = conform-to-cooperate; 1 = reciprocate-to-cooperate), partner knowledge 
conditions, reputational concern, subjective commitment, the two-way interactions 
(reciprocity/conformity conditions × reputational concern; reciprocity/conformity conditions 
× subjective commitment) and the three-way interactions (reciprocity/conformity conditions × 
partner knowledge conditions × reputational concern; reciprocity/conformity conditions × 
partner knowledge conditions × subjective commitment). All predictors were mean centered. 
Reputational concern and subjective commitment did not have a significant main effect on 
cooperation (see supplemental materials for complete report of the model).  
There was a significant interaction between the reciprocity/conformity conditions and 
reputational concern predicting cooperation, b = 14.63, t(689) = 5.87, p < .001 (see Figure 3). 
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We further examine this interaction in the condition which is replicated across the three 
studies in our paper (i.e., the condition with information about partner behavior), in order to 
facilitate the comparison of results across the studies. At low levels of reputational concern (− 
1 SD), people were more inclined to reciprocate than conform, t(347) = 6.52, p < .001, d = 
0.70. But for high levels of reputational concern (+ 1 SD) people were more inclined to 
conform than reciprocate, t(347) = −3.35, p < .001, d = −0.36 . The same pattern of 
interaction was found between the reciprocity/conformity conditions and levels of subjective 
commitment, b = 5.56, t(689) = 2.96, p = .003 (Figure 3). At low levels of subjective 
commitment (− 1 SD), people were more inclined to reciprocate than conform, t(347) = 4.99, 
p < .001, d = 0.54 , but at high levels of subjective commitment (+ 1 SD) people were more 
inclined to conform than reciprocate, t(347) = −2.01, p = .04, d = −0.22. 
 
Figure 3. Floodlight of the regions of reputational concern and subjective commitment for which there 
is a statistically significant effect of the reciprocity/conformity conditions on cooperation. 
Mediation model. We tested whether the reciprocity/conformity conditions 
influenced cooperation through the mediation of perceived group norms and expectations of 
partner cooperation using the bootstrapping method for multiple mediation (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008). We test this model in the condition when partner information was present to 
make comparisons with Study 1. The results show significant indirect effects of both 
expectations of partner cooperation, b = 13.55, 95% CI [4.84, 22.98], and perceived group 
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norms, b = −12.07, 95% CI [−17.48, −7.04]. The total effect of reciprocity/conformity on 
cooperation (total effect = 7.84, p = .037, 95% CI [0.47, 15.20]) became nonsignificant when 
the mediators were included in the model (direct effect = 6.36, p = .31,  95% CI [−5.90, 
18.61]). 
We also tested the same model when partner information was absent. The results show 
significant indirect effects of both expectations of partner cooperation, b = 22.79, 95% CI 
[17.61, 28.75], and perceived group norms, b =17.16, 95% CI [3.30, 31.91]. The total effect 
of reciprocity/conformity on cooperation (total effect = 33.14, p < .001, 95% CI [25.85, 
40.44]) became nonsignificant when the mediators were included in the model (direct effect = 
−6.80, p = .34,  95% CI [−20.77, 7.17]). These results suggest that people were using group 
member behavior to infer partner behavior, which influenced cooperation.  
Study 3  
Method 
Although participants displayed conformity to group norms of cooperation in both 
Studies 1 and 2, we found that they were more inclined to reciprocate partner cooperation 
than conform to group norms of cooperation. Nonetheless, the previous studies lacked an 
important feature of learning group norms – a prestigious group member. Therefore, in Study 
3 we replicate the previous paradigm, but now include a prestigious member in the group. The 
implementation of the prestigious member is not a manipulated variable in this study, but is 
used to create a situation that will produce even stronger group conformity.  
In Study 2, we also found that reputational concern influenced when people decided to 
conform to group norms of cooperation. Thus, people may be cooperative in groups to acquire 
indirect benefits of cooperation – a finding more aligned with a reciprocity approach 
compared to a gene-culture coevolutionary approach. Therefore, to reduce the possibility of 
reputational concern we also manipulated the anonymity of cooperation decisions. According 
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to a reciprocity perspective, anonymity does not provide an opportunity for indirect 
reciprocity, so anonymity should reduce the influence of group member behavior on 
cooperation. A gene-culture coevolutionary approach, however, does not predict that 
anonymity will affect how individuals conform to group norms of cooperation.  
Participants and procedure. Participants (N = 699; 407 women, Mage = 35.96 years, 
SD = 11.21) were recruited from MTurk and completed the study for $1.20. Twenty 
participants won a 2 dollars prize. Sample size is reported after excluding 5 participants who 
had participated in the previous studies. The study was a 2 (reciprocate-to-cooperate vs. 
conform-to-cooperate) × 2 (public monitoring vs anonymity) between-subjects design. 
The procedure is the same as the previous studies, with two exceptions: (1) the 
addition of a prestigious member to the group and (2) a manipulation of anonymity. 
Participants first completed the survival task (where we now establish a prestigious member 
of the group, see below), and then interacted with a non-group member (Person B) in the PD. 
Participants were told that they could observe how each member of the group and Person B 
behaved in the previous interactions. After that, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
two conditions; (1) a situation where others could observe their choice (i.e., the same situation 
as the previous Studies) or (2) that their choice was anonymous. Lastly, participants 
completed the measures of expected partner cooperation, perceived group norm of 
cooperation, reputational concern (α = .88) and subjective commitment to the group (α = .95). 
Prestigious member. Prestigious group members usually have some particular skills 
within the group and are considered the most important members (Henrich, Chudek, & Boyd, 
2015). Here, the prestigious group member was determined by successful decisions in the 
survival task that benefitted the group survival. Participants were told that their survival 
depended on their own and group members’ choices, and that group members would be rank 
ordered based on how well their decision benefitted the survival of the group. The top ranked 
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individual was the prestigious member. As a manipulation check, we asked participants to 
select who they thought was the most important member of the group. As expected, 92% of 
participants considered the 1st ranked individual as the most important member in the group. 
The other group member decisions followed the same structure as previous studies.  However, 
the prestigious member always made the fourth decision with Person B. Participants observed 
how the prestigious member behaved towards Person B, which was 100 or 0, respectively.  
Public monitoring vs anonymity conditions. In the public monitoring condition, 
participants were told that although they were the last to make a choice in the PD task, the 
other five members of their crew would observe how they behaved towards Person B.  By 
contrast, in the anonymity condition, participants were told that since they were the last to 
make a choice in the PD task, then the other five members would not observe their behavior. 
Results  
 Manipulation checks. Participants expected greater partner cooperation after 
observing their partner cooperate on several previous trails (M = 74.64, SD = 30.47), 
compared to when their partner did not cooperate (M = 13.81, SD = 23.76), t(697) = 29.39, d 
= 2.22. Also, people perceived a cooperative group norm when their group members were 
consistently cooperative (M = 63.09, SD = 39.36), compared to noncooperative (M = 18.32, 
SD = 24.96), t(697) = −17.98, d = −1.35.  
Cooperation. A 2 × 2 ANOVA shows a main effect of the reciprocity/conformity 
conditions, F(1,695) = 4.24; p = .04, d = 0.16. Participants cooperated more in the 
reciprocate-to-cooperate condition (M = 32.45, SD = 36.79), compared to the conform-to-
cooperate condition (M = 26.62, SD = 35.71). There was not a significant main effect of 
anonymity, F(1,695) = 1.20; p > .25. There was also not a significant interaction between the 
reciprocity/conformity conditions and anonymity, F(1,695) = 0.16; p > .25. 
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Reputational concern and subjective commitment. We conducted a multiple 
regression analysis in which cooperation was regressed onto the reciprocity/conformity 
conditions (0 = conform-to-cooperate; 1 = reciprocate-to-cooperate), anonymity condition 
reputational concern, subjective commitment, the two-way interactions 
(reciprocity/conformity conditions × reputational concern, reciprocity/conformity conditions 
× subjective commitment), and the three-way interactions (reciprocity/conformity conditions 
× anonymity conditions × reputational concern; reciprocity/conformity conditions × 
anonymity conditions × subjective commitment). All the predictors were mean centered. The 
interaction term between the reciprocity/conformity conditions and reputational concern was 
significant, b = −12.00, t(692) = −4.64, p < .001 (Figure 4). Examining the simple effects, at 
low levels of reputational concern (− 1 SD), people were more inclined to reciprocate than 
conform, t(697) = 6.14, p < .001, d = 0.46. However, at high levels of reputational concern 
(+1 SD), people were more inclined to conform than reciprocate, t(697) = −3.09, p < .001, d = 
−0.23. We observed a similar pattern of interaction between reciprocity/conformity conditions 
and subjective commitment predicting cooperation, b = −5.23 , t(692) = −2.84, p = .005 
(Figure 4). At low levels of subjective commitment (- 1 SD), people were more inclined to 
reciprocate than conform, t(697) = 5.05, p < .001, d = 0.38. However, at high levels of 
subjective commitment (+1 SD), people were more inclined to conform than reciprocate, 
t(697) = −2.17, p = .03, d = −0.16.  
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Figure 4. Floodlight of the regions of reputational concern and subjective commitment for which there 
is a statistically significant effect of the reciprocity/conformity conditions on cooperation. 
Mediation analysis. We tested whether the reciprocity/conformity conditions 
influenced cooperation through the mediation of group norms and expectations of partner 
cooperation using the bootstrapping method for multiple mediation (model 4, Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008). Replicating Study 2, there is a significant indirect effect of both expectations of 
partner cooperation, b = 12.97.12, 95% CI [6.33, 19.51], and perceived group norms, b = 
−9.94, 95% CI [−13.84, −6.01]. The total effect of reciprocity/conformity on cooperation 
(total effect = 5.82, p = .03, 95% CI [0.43, 11.21]) became nonsignificant when the mediators 
were included in the model (direct effect = 2.79, p = .53,  95% CI [−5.89, 11.46]). 
General Discussion 
An emerging consensus between the social and biological sciences is that humans 
evolved to cooperate – and so engage in costly behaviors that benefit others. Yet, how 
humans evolved to cooperate is still intensely debated. One approach stresses the importance 
of direct and indirect benefits of reciprocity in small hunter-gatherer societies (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1992). Another approach emphasizes how people learn norms, including norms to 
cooperate (Henrich, 2004). Perhaps people evolved to reciprocate and to learn norms of 
cooperation, and each mechanism competes for influence over decisions to cooperate. The 
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primary goal of the present research was to test whether reciprocity or conformity would 
constrain the influence of the other psychological mechanism to affect cooperation.  
To examine this issue, we placed people in a group and then had them interact with a 
non-group member in a cooperation task. Before participants made their own decisions, they 
observed their group members cooperate (or defect) with the same non-group member who 
defected (or cooperated). Across the three studies, when partner behavior deviated from the 
group behavior, then people adjusted their behavior to their partner’s behavior. That is, people 
displayed a stronger tendency to reciprocate partner (expected) cooperation compared to 
conform to group norms of cooperation (random effect meta-analysis across 3 studies; n = 
1401; d = 0.34, 95% CI [0.05, 0.64]). In fact, reciprocity outperformed conformity even in 
Study 3 when prestige-biased social learning could enhance learning of social norms and 
anonymity could decrease the role of indirect reciprocity. 
A few additional findings support that reciprocity can have a relatively stronger 
influence than conformity in regulating how people cooperate. First, conformity in our studies 
can be partly explained by reputation-based indirect reciprocity. People tended to conform 
when they had high reputational concern, but when people didn’t care about how group 
members would evaluate their behavior, then they reciprocated partner behavior. Second, we 
observed the largest amount of cooperation when both the group and partner were cooperative 
on previous trials. So, norms of cooperation are much easier to arise and be maintained when 
they correspond with what would be promoted by a psychology that evolved to reciprocate. 
Third, people did not behave differently across public and anonymous situations in 
responding to reciprocity opportunities, suggesting that cues of reciprocity can  regulate 
cooperation in the absence of the threat of social evaluations and sanctions (Delton et al., 
2011). Finally, even when we did not provide information about partner behavior (Study 2), 
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people tended to use group member behavior to infer expected partner behavior, and then 
conditioned behavior on those expectations – further supporting a reciprocity account.   
In support of a gene-culture coevolutionary approach, we found that variation in 
subjective commitment to the group influenced when people tended to conform to the group. 
At high levels of subjective commitment to the group, people tended to conform to the group, 
as opposed to reciprocate partner cooperation. Thus, a gene-culture coevolutionary theory 
may apply to predict behavior at sufficiently high levels of subjective commitment. Future 
research can examine the factors that give rise to sufficient levels of subjective commitment 
(e.g. intergroup competition, group success, and high interdependence among group 
members). Although there was a medium-sized correlation between subjective commitment 
and reputational concern (random effects meta-analysis, r = 0.43, 95% CI [0.39, 0.48]), each 
motivation explained unique variation in when people conformed to the group versus 
reciprocated partner cooperation. Future research can further examine these two motivations 
underlying why people conform to norms of cooperation.  
Our studies used online methods, which might fail to elicit the emotional and 
motivational responses that would promote conformity during interactions with group 
members who are present and visible – similar to the original Asch studies (1956). 
Importantly, the same is true for reciprocity – when interaction partners are present (and 
visible) people can use many cues to predict a partner’s behavior and this can promote 
reciprocity and cooperation (Drolet & Morris, 2000). In our studies, we had a total of five 
group members who all behaved similarly, a situation that is known to elicit strong 
conformity (Asch, 1956). Indeed, we observed conformity to group norms of cooperation in 
our online task, especially in Study 2 when we did not provide information about their 
partner’s previous behavior. Our use of an online experimental environment provides a clean, 
replicable, methodology that can harness the statistical power of larger sample sizes.     
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Numerous adaptive problems involve cooperation, such as selecting and maintaining 
beneficial relationships, increasing reputational standing in a group, and success during 
intergroup competition. Thus, evolution may have shaped numerous psychological processes 
that affect when and how people cooperate. These psychological processes would operate in 
parallel and could potentially compete for influence over when people cooperate. Here we 
constructed a decision environment where reciprocity and conformity predicted a different 
(non)cooperative response. We found that people were more inclined to reciprocate than 
conform. Thus, the relatively phylogenetically ancient psychological mechanisms of cheater 
detection and reciprocity may claim relatively greater influence over decisions to cooperate. 
Such evidence enlightens us about the conditions when specific psychological mechanisms 
apply to explain cooperation.  
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